The bill amends existing law to expand public-records exemptions and change who must respond to certain election records requests. It amends RCW 42.56.425 to exempt in full continuity-of-operations plans and related security audits, assessments, and test results; to exempt portions of records that contain technical details of election infrastructure; to exempt voter signatures (including originals, copies, and electronic images) and a voter's phone number and email address on ballot return envelopes, ballot declarations, and signature correction forms; to exempt records about private entities' infrastructure submitted to elections officials for 25 years when accompanied by an express statement that disclosure would increase risk; and to exempt voted ballots, voted ballot images, copies, photographs, facsimiles, and cast vote records from the time of ballot return through storage and eventual destruction. The bill also requires that requests for records from or reports generated by the statewide voter registration database (RCW 29A.08.105) be submitted to and fulfilled by the secretary of state; county elections offices are prohibited from producing those database records and must direct requestors to the secretary of state by the deadline in RCW 42.56.520. The secretary of state may authorize in-person inspection of unredacted ballot return envelopes, ballot declarations, and signature correction forms under RCW 29A.04.260. The bill also changes criminal law by amending RCW 29A.84.150 to create a new penalty: it makes it a class C felony for state or local election officers or their designees to knowingly use, disclose, or alter voter‑registration database information in a way inconsistent with performing their duties, and for knowingly violating confidentiality rules for certain personal identifiers. The act is declared an emergency and takes effect immediately. The bill passed the House on February 28, 2026, and the Senate on March 9, 2026, and was prefiled on December 16, 2025. Important statutory texts and specific deadlines or sentencing details cited from other RCWs (for example RCW 42.56.520, RCW 29A.60.110, RCW 29A.12.200, RCW 9A.20.021, and RCW 29A.08.105) are referenced but not included here, so those specific provisions and definitions are not shown in this summary.

If enacted, county election offices would stop responding to requests for records from the statewide voter registration database and must direct all such requests to the secretary of state, making the secretary the central point for those disclosures and likely increasing that office’s workload and control over what is released. At the same time, a wide range of election security materials and ballot-related items — including continuity plans, security audits and test results, technical details of election systems, voters’ signatures and contact details on return forms, and voted ballots or their images and cast vote records during retention — would be shielded from public disclosure, and private entities’ infrastructure records can be withheld for 25 years if accompanied by an express statement. These changes will reduce public access to many election-related records and shift responsibility for handling sensitive requests to the secretary of state. State and local election officers and their designees would face new criminal exposure: knowingly misusing, disclosing, or altering voter-registration database information or violating confidentiality rules for certain personal identifiers is made a class C felony, which will likely lead to stronger internal controls, training, and legal risk management for election staff. The bill takes effect immediately. Important details are missing from the extracted facts, including the exact public-records deadlines and procedures referenced, the secretary of state’s rules for in-person inspections, and the sentencing specifics for a class C felony under the cited statute.