The bill amends RCW 42.56.420 to add a new public records exemption for "critical energy infrastructure information" collected in support of the state energy resilience and emergency management office, while retaining the other security-related exemptions already listed in that section (for example, vulnerability assessments, response and deployment plans, correctional facility emergency plans, safe school plan vulnerabilities, computer and telecommunications network security details, a system security and emergency preparedness plan required under certain RCWs, and certain personally identifiable and security information of private cloud service provider employees under CJIS agreements). This is a procedural change to public disclosure law, not a criminal or penalty provision. The bill defines "critical energy infrastructure" as systems and assets, physical or virtual, whose incapacity or destruction could disrupt or diminish the supply of energy so that public health, safety, or the general welfare may be jeopardized. It defines "critical energy infrastructure information" to cover records about actual, potential, or threatened interference, attacks, compromise, or incapacitation of such infrastructure or protected systems by physical or computer-based attacks (or similar conduct that violates law, harms interstate commerce of Washington or the United States, or threatens energy supply), and information that is more specific than general location or publicly available details. The Department of Commerce introduced the bill; it was read for the first time on 01/30/25 and referred to the Committee on State Government, Tribal Affairs & Elections. The amendment cites RCW 42.56.420 and references several other statutes (including chapter 71.09 RCW; RCW 28A.320.125; RCW 35.21.228; RCW 35A.21.300; RCW 36.01.210; RCW 36.57.120; RCW 36.57A.170; RCW 81.112.180) and the DOJ CJIS security policy as authorized by 28 C.F.R. Part 20. The provided text shows only the amended language of RCW 42.56.420 and does not include any other sections of the bill or broader legislative context. The document excerpt does not define "protected systems" or give statutory details for the state energy resilience and emergency management office, and it does not include the CJIS policy text relied upon.

If enacted, the bill would make detailed records about critical energy infrastructure collected by the state energy resilience and emergency management office exempt from public disclosure, so requesters would likely be denied access to non‑public details about attacks, threats, compromises, or vulnerabilities of energy systems beyond general location or already public information. That will reduce the chance that sensitive infrastructure details are exposed and potentially used by bad actors, but it will also reduce public transparency and limit who can review or challenge those records. The state energy resilience and emergency management office and the Department of Commerce are the most directly affected because they will hold and manage the newly exempt records, and utilities or other entities that provide such information will gain greater confidentiality. The bill text does not specify new funding, handling procedures, or define "protected systems" beyond the provided definition of critical energy infrastructure, so there is uncertainty about administrative costs, training or clear operational rules for applying the exemption.