This bill amends RCW 10.93.150. It bars a law enforcement agency from taking disciplinary or other adverse personnel action solely because a peace officer’s name was placed on a prosecuting attorney’s list of recurring witnesses with known potential impeachment information (a “Brady/Giglio list”). It preserves an agency’s ability to discipline based on the underlying acts or omissions that led to placement on such a list, but only if those actions conform to the agency’s rules and procedures as determined through collective bargaining. The bill creates a procedural change by giving a peace officer a due process right to petition the superior court, appeal, or intervene in any action about a prosecuting agency’s decision to place the officer on a Brady/Giglio list. The superior court is given jurisdiction to review the prosecuting agency’s decision, conduct an in-camera review of evidence, hold a closed hearing at the request of either party or on the court’s discretion, and affirm, modify, or reverse the decision and order appropriate relief, including removal from the list. All evidence in such proceedings must be kept under seal and confidential unless otherwise ordered, and the standard of proof in the cited subsection is a preponderance of the evidence unless a higher standard is required by law. The statute explicitly states it does not alter a prosecuting attorney’s duty to disclose potential impeachment, exculpatory, or credibility information to defense counsel under Brady and Giglio. The text provided does not define key terms (for example, “Brady and Giglio list,” “peace officer,” or “prosecuting agency”), does not describe how prosecuting agencies place officers on such lists, and does not include filing procedures, timelines, effective dates, or other transitional provisions.

If enacted, peace officers would be protected from being disciplined just because a prosecutor put their name on a Brady/Giglio list; agencies could still discipline officers for the underlying conduct, but only by following their existing, collectively bargained rules. Practically, that means law enforcement employers may need to rely more on formal internal investigations and collective bargaining processes instead of taking immediate personnel actions tied solely to a prosecutor’s list, which could slow or change how discipline is imposed and shift costs toward longer procedures governed by labor agreements. Prosecuting offices would face a new route for officers to challenge placements through superior court, likely increasing court filings, private in‑camera hearings, and legal work for both sides while keeping evidence sealed unless the court orders otherwise; officers gain a clearer, though potentially burdensome, option to seek removal of their names. Key implementation details are missing here—terms like what qualifies for the list, exact petition timelines, and filing procedures are not defined—so the timing, cost, and volume of challenges and how agencies must adjust remain uncertain.