This bill amends RCW 19.405.090 and adds new sections to give utilities more regulatory flexibility while creating new administrative penalties and procedures to enforce clean energy standards. It establishes an administrative penalty for using generation to meet load that is not from a renewable resource or nonemitting electric generation equal to $100 per megawatt-hour multiplied by specified factors (1.5 for coal, 0.84 for gas peaking plants, 0.60 for gas combined‑cycle plants). The penalty is adjusted biennially for inflation beginning in 2027, and the Utilities and Transportation Commission may increase the penalty for investor‑owned utilities beginning in 2040. Utilities may pay the penalty as an alternative compliance payment under RCW 19.405.040(1)(b), and penalty receipts must be deposited into the low‑income weatherization and structural rehabilitation assistance account (RCW 70A.35.030). The bill creates procedural changes for enforcement and temporary relief: the commission may, after a hearing, relieve an investor‑owned utility of penalty obligations or temporarily exempt it from certain statutory standards if compliance would conflict with NERC reliability standards, prudent utility practice, power quality, or reasons beyond reasonable control; the commission can require progress reports and direct actions. Governing bodies of consumer‑owned utilities may authorize temporary exemptions (up to six months) subject to auditor review before penalty relief, and the attorney general may bring civil actions if conditions of an exemption are not met. The bill also sets multiyear compliance periods and substantive standards (a greenhouse‑gas neutrality policy by Jan 1, 2030, phased multiyear compliance periods through Dec 31, 2044 with up to 20% alternative compliance through 2044, and a 100% nonemitting/renewable supply requirement by Jan 1, 2045), defines alternative compliance options (including unbundled RECs, energy transformation projects, certain energy recovery facilities, and alternative compliance payments), limits new hydro developments after May 7, 2019, and provides for early‑action credits and condemnation compensation rules. Important details are incomplete or unclear in the extracted text: the statutory identity of “the department” is not specified, portions of subsection (11)(b) and other subsections are cut off, and some referenced definitions and the full amended text of RCW 19.405.040 and 19.405.050 are not included.

If enacted, the bill creates a new, fuel‑specific financial stick for using fossil generation: utilities or market customers that rely on nonrenewable, emitting generation would owe $100 per megawatt‑hour multiplied by a factor (1.5 for coal, 0.84 for gas peakers, 0.60 for combined‑cycle gas), with the charge indexed for inflation starting in 2027 and subject to potential increase for investor‑owned utilities after 2040. That money would be routed to the state low‑income weatherization and structural rehabilitation account, and utilities can instead make alternative compliance payments or use specified alternative compliance options (including some renewable credits and energy transformation projects) for part of their obligation through 2044. The law also formalizes a stepwise compliance timeline—greenhouse‑gas neutral policy by 2030, multiyear compliance blocks from 2030–2044 with up to 20% alternative compliance through 2044, and a 100% nonemitting/renewable supply requirement by 2045—while allowing the commission, department, or governor to grant relief or temporary exemptions for reliability reasons, and permitting a declared resource‑adequacy crisis to let a utility designate natural‑gas generation for reliability up to 30 years. Investor‑owned utilities, consumer‑owned utilities, affected market customers, and multistate utilities are most affected: they face stronger financial incentives and pressure to invest in renewables, storage, conservation, or buy alternative compliance instruments, but they also gain formal paths to avoid penalties if reliability standards, force‑majeure events, or court‑ordered condemnations interfere. Consumer‑owned utilities get short, auditor‑verified exemption authority and the attorney general can enforce compliance conditions; investor‑owned utilities can seek commission relief after a hearing. Important implementation details are missing from the provided text—most notably the statutory identity of “the department,” full rules and thresholds for declaring a resource adequacy crisis, and some amended sections that are cut off—so the precise process and standards utilities must follow to qualify for relief or to use certain credits remain unclear.