This bill creates a new statutory cause of action (declared a new chapter in Title 7 RCW) permitting a person injured by an individual who had been previously arrested for a “violent offense” to sue a superior, district, or municipal court judge when the judge released that individual before trial by declining to impose what a plaintiff later alleges was reasonable bail, the released individual caused injury after release, and the judge failed to adequately consider the risk of public harm. The bill eliminates any form of judicial immunity as a defense in actions brought under this new section. The section is effective January 1, 2026, and a suit must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues (discovery by the plaintiff or when the plaintiff reasonably should have discovered the elements). The bill requires courts to award prevailing plaintiffs actual damages as determined by the trier of fact and at least nominal damages, and permits awards of costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and declaratory or injunctive relief. It preserves the general rule that elected or appointed officials may have legal defense and judgments paid by the state or political subdivision, but creates an exception: if the trier of fact finds by clear and convincing evidence that the judge intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly disregarded the risk of public harm, the judge is personally liable for all defense costs and the judgment, the state or political subdivision must not pay subsequent defense costs or judgment, and any defense costs previously paid by the state or political subdivision must be repaid by the defendant within one year of entry of judgment. The act amends RCW 4.92.070, 4.92.075, and 4.96.041 to add the proviso “Except as provided in section 1(7) of this act.” The bill defines “violent offense” by reference to RCW 9.94A.030 and specifies what “adequate consideration” means for a judge: a written and published assessment that analyzes all known evidence about the alleged violent offense, the individual’s criminal record and risk of further violence, the vulnerability of prior or likely future victims, and the adequacy of alternatives to pretrial detention; and consideration of all relevant and reasonably available evidence, including public records and testimony from law enforcement, experts, crime victims, and victim advocates. Whether imposed bail was “reasonable” is a question of fact based on the totality of circumstances known to the judge. The act contains a severability clause, is to be liberally construed, applies only to causes arising on or after its effective date, and states it does not affect other common law or statutory rights. The extracted text references other statutes and procedures (for example, the specific content of RCW 9.94A.030, RCW 4.92 and 4.96 provisions, RCW 4.92.130, and federal statutes) and omits procedural details such as the new chapter number within Title 7 and specific trial or interlocutory procedures; those external provisions and procedural specifics are not included in the provided text.

If enacted, people injured by someone released before trial after an arrest for a violent offense can sue the judge who set bail if the judge failed to adequately consider the risk of public harm and the released person caused injury. Judges would no longer be able to use judicial immunity in these suits, plaintiffs can recover actual (and at least nominal) damages plus fees and costs, and suits must be started within three years of when the injury and the judge’s role are discovered. The law takes effect January 1, 2026 and gives the factfinder (judge or jury) the role of deciding damages and whether a judge acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. The people and entities most affected are superior, district, and municipal court judges, who face new personal financial risk and will likely change how they handle pretrial release—including creating written assessments and gathering testimony and records about the alleged offense, victim vulnerability, and alternatives to detention—to reduce exposure. State and local governments and their insurers will still generally pay defense costs and judgments unless a judge is found by clear and convincing evidence to have intentionally/knowingly/recklessly disregarded risk, in which case the judge becomes personally liable and must repay any public defense costs paid within one year; this also raises the prospect of more litigation and administrative cost for governments. Important implementation details such as the exact statutory placement, the statutory definition of “violent offense,” and trial procedures are referenced in other laws and are not included here, so some operational questions remain.