This bill adds and amends sections in chapter 43.102 RCW to expand the office of independent investigations and prosecutions’ authority to investigate and to initiate and conduct prosecutions of use-of-deadly-force incidents by involved officers, including related offenses, appeals, and requests for postconviction relief. The authority applies to incidents occurring after July 1, 2022, and allows the office to review prior deadly-force investigations if new evidence is presented. If the attorney general, a county prosecutor, and the independent prosecutor file competing charges for substantially the same offenses, a court must designate which prosecution best promotes the interests of justice and dismiss the other filing. The bill creates procedural and organizational changes: the director oversees the office and must appoint a licensed independent prosecutor (who serves a three-year term and has final charging and staffing authority) and may appoint interim or assistant independent prosecutors. The director may hire or contract investigators, prosecutors, and support staff, develop regional investigation teams and notification/response plans, require trainings (including antiracist, bias, and investigation training), and ensure investigators receive background checks and social media reviews for racial bias and conflicts. The office must generally be the lead investigative body when it accepts a case, have access to records from involved agencies and 911 centers, and conclude investigations within 120 days or report delays to the advisory board. The director and advisory board must develop a plan to train nonlaw-enforcement investigators and report a proposal by December 1, 2025, with an objective that such nonlaw-enforcement investigators handle cases within five years. The bill also establishes an advisory board of 13 governor-appointed members with specified duties and confidentiality requirements, sets financial responsibilities (the office pays prosecution-related expert fees and costs while counties pay court administration and public defense costs for qualifying defendants; reimbursement is subject to RCW 9A.16.046), requires a public written report if charges are declined after a fatal use of deadly force, and provides liability protection for office personnel acting in good faith. Several related RCW sections and full provisions are not included in the extracted text, the effective date tied to the nine-month appointment deadline is not provided here, and some definitions and complete statutory language are missing from these excerpts.

If enacted, the state will have a new office that can investigate and also bring prosecutions for deadly-force incidents that happened after July 1, 2022, and can reopen earlier cases if new evidence appears. The office will lead accepted investigations, aims to complete them within 120 days (or report why not), and will have an independent prosecutor with final charging and staffing authority appointed by the director; that office pays prosecution expert and related prosecution costs, while the county where a case is filed remains responsible for court administration and public defense for eligible defendants. Courts must pick which prosecutor goes forward when the attorney general, a county prosecutor, and the independent prosecutor file substantially the same charges, and victims or survivors must be kept informed and receive written reports when charges in fatal deadly-force cases are declined. Primary effects will fall on law enforcement agencies (they must notify the office and provide records and may lose local control of investigations), county prosecutors and the attorney general (they may be supplanted on some cases and could face court adjudications deciding which prosecutor proceeds), counties (which will still bear public defense and court administration costs), and the new office itself (which will need funding for prosecutors, investigators, expert witnesses, and training aimed at antiracism and a planned shift to non‑law‑enforcement investigators). Key implementation details are missing from the provided text—such as the exact effective date for the director’s nine‑month appointment deadline, the complete jurisdictional language, and final funding sources—so the scale and timing of costs and staffing changes remain uncertain.