House Bill 1508 creates a new statutory chapter in Title 79 RCW and amends several existing statutes to allow the Department of Natural Resources, with Board of Natural Resources approval, to enter into payment-for-ecosystem-service contracts on public lands to generate additional revenue. The bill authorizes sales or contracts for ecosystem service credits (limited to afforestation, reforestation, and aquatic projects) and permits the department to offer credits into compliance or voluntary marketplaces and to contract with project developers or brokers by auction or direct negotiation, subject to board rules and board approval. Contracts for ecosystem service credits are capped at 125 years, proceeds must be deposited in appropriate state treasury accounts, and the bill amends RCW 79.02.010 to exclude ecosystem services from the statutory definition of “valuable materials.” The bill changes procedural and revenue distribution rules in existing law: it requires the department to publish a notice of intent to negotiate within 90 days before negotiations, report to the board upon contract execution, and deliver a report to the Office of Financial Management and the legislature by December 1, 2026 (that reporting requirement expires June 30, 2027). It amends provisions governing sale and distribution of receipts from state forestlands and aquatic lands so that proceeds from sales, leases, and sales of ecosystem services are deposited and distributed under specified formulas (including placement in the aquatic lands enhancement account and specific allocations between forest development accounts, counties, and the state general fund for school benefits). The bill also conditions any sale of ecosystem services on consistency with the new chapter and states that ecosystem services may not be sold if that new chapter is not codified. This is primarily a substantive and procedural change in property and contract law and in revenue disposition—establishing a new legal authority and procedural framework for ecosystem service transactions and altering how related proceeds are distributed. The extracted material does not show the full text of several referenced sections, the actual new chapter number is a placeholder (79.--RCW), and specific amendments to some cited RCWs are cut off or missing, so some details and complete statutory language are not available from the provided excerpts.

If enacted, the Department of Natural Resources would be able to generate new revenue by contracting to sell standardized ecosystem service credits from a narrow set of projects (afforestation, reforestation, and aquatic projects) on public lands, including long-term contracts up to 125 years and direct sales into compliance or voluntary markets. That shifts real responsibilities onto the department and the Board of Natural Resources (approval, publishing negotiation notices, setting minimum payments, and reporting) and creates new business opportunities for ecosystem project developers and brokers, while tribes’ treaty and access rights must be protected. Revenues from sales on aquatic lands must go into the aquatic lands enhancement account for specified aquatic purposes, and proceeds from forestland sales will flow to the forest development account and to counties or school funds according to existing acquisition-based formulas, with the department required to certify receipts quickly and the state treasurer to disburse frequently. Some practical risks and costs are that long-term contracts can lock in revenue streams or expose beneficiaries to market volatility, and the department takes on more administrative and compliance duties; who ultimately benefits financially depends on which statute governed the land’s acquisition because distribution formulas differ (e.g., up to 25% to forest development and the remainder to counties for certain lands versus a 50/50 split for others). Key implementation details are missing here—the new chapter that sets the full conditions and some specific amendments are not included—so some operational limits, procedural steps, and precise revenue-sharing outcomes remain unclear.