This bill makes procedural changes to Washington election law by amending existing statutes and adding new sections to chapter 29A.60 RCW and to RCW 29A.04.611. It revises how physically damaged or unreadable ballots are handled, authorizing county auditors to refer such ballots to the county canvassing board or to duplicate them only when a voter's intent is clear and equipment might not correctly tally the ballot. The bill imposes safeguards on duplication (teams of two or more, unique control numbers on originals and duplicates, a duplication log, and secure sealing) and requires an audit comparing each duplicate to its original before election certification. The bill replaces a prior multi-method postelection audit requirement with a requirement that, prior to certification, the county auditor must conduct at minimum either a limited hand-count audit (new section 3) or a risk-limiting audit (new section 4). The limited hand-count option includes specific procedures: random selection of precincts or batches, at least one precinct or two batches per scanner, limitation to one office or issue per selected unit, expansion procedures if discrepancies arise, completion of manual tallies no later than 72 hours after election day, and reporting results to the secretary of state within three business days. The bill defines several types of risk-limiting audits, directs the secretary of state to define the acceptable risk limit by rule using statistical standards, requires counties conducting RLAs to use software or processes approved by and independent of their voting system, and authorizes both county and, under conditions, state-level comparison RLAs, including multi-county shared-district RLAs with all participating counties’ agreement. The bill also amends procedures for observers and counting centers by requiring county auditors to solicit lists of prospective observers from major political parties at least 28 days before elections, limiting handling of ballots and operation of tally systems to authorized staff, and requiring counting centers to be open to the public and to one party-appointed observer per major party (if present). RCW 29A.04.611 is expanded to require secretary of state rulemaking on detailed audit methods, discrepancy resolution, and other administrative matters. Separately, the bill includes additional provisions (listed but not fully detailed in the provided extracts) concerning deadlines for filing ballot titles for referendums and constitutional amendments, state voters’ pamphlet publication, special-election timing for nuclear waste site questions, partisan primary procedures, accessibility standards for voting technology, data formats and system interactions to support the statewide voter registration list under HAVA, a state HAVA administrative complaint procedure, grant facilitation, and standards for signature verification on ballot declarations. Important details and some statutory text are missing from the extracts provided (including the full definition of “cast vote record,” the contents of section 5 referenced in definitions, and complete amended text for certain RCW sections), and the extracts do not show any changes to criminal penalties.

If enacted, county auditors would take on clearer and stricter duties to handle damaged or unreadable ballots, including duplicating ballots only in teams of two or more with unique control numbers, maintaining logs, sealing originals and duplicates, and performing an audit comparing each duplicate to its original before certifying the election. Counties must also run a postelection audit before certification — either a limited hand-count of randomly selected precincts/batches that must be finished within 72 hours after election day and reported to the secretary of state within three business days, or a risk-limiting audit (RLA) using secretary-of-state–approved software or processes independent of county voting systems. The secretary of state gains substantial rulemaking and oversight authority to set the RLA risk limit, approve audit software/processes, coordinate state-level RLAs when counties’ systems allow ballot comparison RLAs, and require counting centers to be open to limited partisan observers and the public while restricting who may handle ballots. The practical impacts are increased workload, staffing and training needs, and possible new software or contract costs for county auditors to comply with duplication safeguards, detailed logs, and either hand-count or statistically driven RLAs; counties running comparison RLAs must obtain secretary-of-state–approved tools separate from their voting systems. Political parties and campaigns will be more involved as observers and must provide lists of observers 28 days before elections. Some key implementation details are missing from the provided text — notably the precise risk limit value, final rules the secretary of state will adopt, and the full definition and handling of cast vote records — so timing, exact costs, and operational changes will depend on those forthcoming rules and guidance.